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Abstract 
 Recently many scholars are greatly concerned about the influence of 
institutional investors on companies’ earnings information quality. 
Institutional investors have strong and professional team. With big fund stake 
on listed companies, institutional investors are theoretically thought of playing 
active role in supervising companies to ensure their investment safety and 
return. Much evidence has showed that institutional investors are becoming 
active institutional participation from past passive shareholders. The 
characteristics of institutional show great advantages on exerting their effect 
on corporate governance. Correspondingly positive behavior of institutional 
investors will influence the degree of the accounting information quality. 
Based on this concept, institutional investors can discover in a timely and 
effective manner problems existing in the accounting information disclosure. 
As a result, this article examines whether institutional investors as active 
shareholders can participate in corporate governance in order to improve 
companies’ accounting information quality. 
 
Keywords: Institutional investors, earnings information quality, corporate 
governance 
 
1. Introduction 
 Institutional investors are becoming an important force in Chinese 
capital market. Recently many scholars are greatly concerned about whether 
the growing number of institutional investors can improve corporate 
governance structure? In view of the important role of accounting information 
quality in corporate governance, we will study the impact of institutional 
investors on the quality of accounting information. In fact, there is a 
complementary relationship between accounting information and corporate 
governance. on the one hand, the quality of information disclosure plays a 
decisive role in the governance structure of listed companies. On the other 
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hand, information disclosure is also an important window to reflect the level 
of corporate governance. As an important part of corporate governance, 
accounting information is a link between major shareholders, board of 
directors, executives and external investors. Large shareholders, all levels of 
directors and external investors use accounting earnings information to 
understand the company's operating conditions and value changes in their 
investment and accordingly supervise the performance of executive 
management. In turn, an effective corporate governance structure ensures that 
shareholders receive real and effective information about the company's 
operations. At the same time reasonable corporate governance provides 
effective incentive and helps to motivate corporate managers. Finally it will 
protect the interests of most investors. Therefore, the quality of information 
disclosure plays a decisive role in the governance structure of listed companies. 
Meantime the information disclosure is also an important window to reflect the 
level of corporate governance. Based on these logical analyses, this paper study 
institutional investors’ impact on earnings information quality, and further 
analyze its supervision role in corporate governance system. 
 Information disclosure quality of Chinese listed companies is generally 
low. To some extent this phenomenon also shows that Chinese corporate 
governance structure is not perfect, which give managers the opportunity to 
manipulate accounting earnings. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of 
earnings information, we must strengthen shareholders’ supervision to 
corporate events and managers. For minority shareholders, they lack the 
protection of the law, coupled with monitoring cost, and tend to be “free rider”. 
They are unable to implement effective supervision to listed companies. 
Instead institutional investors have the professional competence and capital 
advantage to participate the supervision of listed companies. This paper takes 
institutional investors as the research object. Much theoretical analyses show 
that institutional investors can improve corporate governance level. We use the 
quality of earnings information to measure the company's governance level, 
and with empirical test method prove that institutional investors can improve 
the company's earnings information quality.  
 We select non-financial listed companies of Chinese capital market as 
sample from 2012 to 2014, and try to explore the relationship between 
institutional investors’ holdings and accounting earnings quality. The 
empirical results show that the earnings quality of listed companies with 
institutional participation is significantly higher than those of other companies 
after controlling the corresponding factors. And the proportion of institutional 
investors is significantly positively correlated with earnings quality. 
2. Literature review 
 Warfield et al. (1995) measure the value relevance of earnings (or 
earning information content) using the correlation coefficient between the 
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stock return and corporate earnings. They found that the proportion of 
management's shareholding is positively related to the value relevance of 
earnings information. At the same time, they also found that the increase in the 
shareholding of the management shares or institutional investors would reduce 
agency costs and correspondingly decrease the likelihood that the managers 
would manipulate the profit figures. Bushman et al. (2000) have found that 
there is a negative relationship between ownership concentration of American 
listed companies and the timeliness of earnings. Ball (2000) argues that the 
earnings disclosures are much more timely for those companies in which 
corporate governance structures show managers are more detached from other 
stakeholders, with high external shareholder holdings and active institutional 
participation in corporate governance. 
 The research results of LaPorta et al. (1998) and Bushman et al. (2000) 
show that when financial accounting systems provided less useful information, 
the company would need much more high-cost shareholders’ supervision. Yeo 
et al. (2002) studied listed companies in Singapore and found that the value of 
accounting information does not necessarily increase with the increase in the 
proportion of management shares. The relationship between these two 
variables is not linear. The shareholding ratio of the external non-related 
interest groups has an impact on the earnings information. It proved that 
external interest groups provide an important supervisory role in the corporate 
governance of Singapore. 
 The increase in shareholding ratio of non-related interest groups 
reduces managers' earnings management opportunities. These studies show 
that the synergistic assumptions of interest are positively related to the value 
of earnings information. Jiambalvo et al. (2002) found that with the increase 
in institutional investor holdings, the share price reflects more current earnings 
information and is conducive to forecasting future earnings. The proportion of 
institutional investors Significant is positively correlated with the extent to 
which the share price reflects earnings information. With the increase in the 
holdings of institutional investors, the current earnings information can be fully 
reflected into the stock price. The more the proportion of institutional 
investors’ holdings, the higher the accuracy of its earnings forecasting is. 
 Firth et al. (2002) used total discretionary accruals to measure 
accounting information quality. They came to a conclusion that the greater the 
holdings of institutional investors, the less are the amount of discretionary 
accrual profit that can be manipulated. Their conclusions confirmed 
institutional investors' role in controlling management earnings manipulation. 
Soo and Kwon (2002) selected the securities of Korean listed companies from 
1993 to 1998 as a sample.They used earnings quality to measure accounting 
information quality and explored the effect of institutional investors on the 
quality of accounting information. They finally found that the major 
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shareholders and the level of institutional investors ‘holdings can have a great 
impact on the quality of accounting information. And they are positively 
proportional to the accuracy of accounting information. Especially when the 
earnings is positive, their influence on the quality of accounting information 
and the explanation of the model are increasing. Sharma (2004) argued that the 
company's financial fraud was related to the proportion of institutional 
investors. After researching the financial fraud of Australian companies, they 
found that the higher the proportion of corporate institutional investors, the less 
likely the financial fraud is. On the same hand, Mitra and Cready (2005) 
concluded that the company's discretionary accrual profit was inversely 
proportional to the proportion of institutional investors after controlling the 
company's information environment and scale. Institutional investors could 
play an active supervisory role in financial reporting. Thus they largely 
reduced the company's corruption practices. These evidences are enough to 
prove that institutional investors can play an important role in restraining and 
supervising the management, which fundamentally enhance the quality of 
listed companies accounting information. 
 To sum up, domestic and foreign institutional research is very 
concerned about role of institutional investors in corporate governance. With 
the development of institutional investors, more and more research found that 
institutional investors can participate in the governance of listed companies. 
However, some Chinese scholars have made empirical analysis on the 
governance effect of institutional investors on the listed companies according 
to the capital market data of China. Many research found that institutional 
investors can improve the governance of the company and play an active 
supervisory role. At the same time as the proportion of institutional holdings, 
the greater is their governance role. From the perspective of earnings 
information to measure the role of institutional investors in the study of 
corporate governance, some foreign researchers believe that institutional 
investors can play a supervisory role in listed companies to improve the 
company's accounting information quality. And domestic research is from a 
number of perspectives to study this issue. Some studies that when institutional 
investors reach a certain proportion, they have an impact on corporate 
accounting information. And some studies that institutional investor’s 
shareholding ratio is proportional to corporate accounting information quality. 
And some studies that different types of institutional investors on the 
company's accounting information quality are not the same. With Chinese 
encouragement of regulatory policies and expansion of securities market, 
institutional investors have also achieved great development. Institutional 
investors have the power and ability to supervise the governance of listed 
companies. Since earnings information is an important basis for investors’ 
investing decision-making, from accounting information quality point of view 
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it is very meaningful to examine institutional investors’ governance role of 
listed companies. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 Grossman and Hart, and Shleifer and Vishny argue that the larger the 
investment, the stronger the investor's ability to supervise listed companies. 
Institutional investors’ investment funds are higher than those of average small 
investors. With large size of the investment stocks, they have more power to 
supervise the listed companies. Compared with the average small investors, 
institutional investors have the advantage of information. On the one hand, 
institutional investors are willing to invest resources to take the initiative to 
collect information. On the other hand, institutional investors may also have 
non-public information. Under the support of professional research team and 
rich information channel institutional investors have a stronger information 
interpretation and value assessment capabilities than ordinary investors. They 
have the ability to distinguish whether the accounting policy of listed 
companies is reasonable and then take the responsibility of certain supervisory 
role. This kind of supervisory role of institutional investors is much more 
necessary under the conditions that the current market mechanism of minority 
shareholders is not well protected; information disclosure and news media are 
not perfect.  
 Institutional investors’ strong demand for accounting information and 
reasonable supervision will force the company to reduce profit manipulation 
and other acts of damage to the fairness of accounting information, thereby 
improving the quality of accounting earnings. Foreign related research also 
confirmed this point of view. Chung, Firth and Kim's research results show 
that institutional investors can reduce the degree of earnings management of 
listed companies. Their research found that institutional investors' holdings can 
reduce the company's discretionary accrual profits. And as the proportion of 
institutional investors holdings increase, the company’s discretionary accrual 
profit gradually reduced. Chidambaran and John's research indirectly indicates 
the supervisory role of institutional investors. They found that institutional 
investors' holdings conveyed positive information about the company to the 
capital market, meaning that the company had more information disclosure and 
greater transparency, helping to strengthen investors’ trust in the company. 
McConnell and Servaes 'research found that there is a significant positive 
correlation between institutional investors' shareholding and corporate value. 
Institutional investors are able to monitor and constrain opportunistic behavior 
of the firm's management and thereby increase the value of the firm. There are 
few studies on the influence of institutional investors on the quality of 
accounting earnings in China. 
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 From behavioral finance, principal-agent theory and property right 
theory, theoretically institutional investors are much more active than small 
investors. We find that the institutional investors with higher shareholding 
have the potential motivations to actively participate in corporate governance 
and assume supervisory role. And then they promote the improvement of 
earnings quality of listed companies. By further analysis of institutional 
investors, institutional investors have strong profit pressures and their own 
regulatory strength, which make institutional investors not easy to sale out 
stocks to exit. Therefore, under the support of professional research team and 
rich information channel, institutional investors with high shareholding ratio 
are active and capable. Under the combined effect of "stuck" motivation, profit 
incentive and policy encouragement, they show positive behavior of 
shareholders, and then assume a certain role in supervision, and promote the 
improvement of earnings quality of listed companies. 
 Reviewing the literature, we conclude institutional investors can 
effectively monitor the earnings management behavior of listed companies. 
De-Fond and Jiambalvo (1991) found that when the company had institutional 
investors that holdmore than 5% of the outstanding shares, the possibility of a 
prior change in profitability by management decreased. Dechow (1996) found 
that in companies with more institutional holdings, the probability of financial 
fraud is reduced. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1997) find that the institutional 
investors' shareholding is negatively correlated with the absolute value of 
subjective accruals. Bushee (1998) has found that when the proportion of 
institutional investors is high, management is less likely to reduce R & D 
expense. This indicates that institutional investors are mature investors and 
supervise managers' short-sighted actions to avoid earnings manipulation. To 
sum up, we put forward the hypothesis that the proportion of institutional 
investors and the quality of earnings information are positively related. The 
higher the proportion of institutional investors, the better is the quality of 
earnings information of listed companies. Since we measure the earnings 
information of listed companies from two different perspectives using 
information disclosure rating and earnings smoothness, we can get the 
following two hypotheses: 
H1a: the higher the proportion of institutional investors’ holdings, 
the higher is the information disclosure rating of listed companies. 
 H1b: the higher the proportion of institutional investors’ holdings, 
the lower is the earnings smoothness of listed companies. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Sample selection and data resources 
 We select 2012-2014 company data listed in Chinese Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock markets. We get a total of 6120 Observations after excluding 
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the financial class companies, ST class and PT class  a total of 6120 
observations and companies in which financial data are missing or incorrect 
data. We use these 6120 observations as a sample for earnings smoothness 
measure of earnings quality. Because the Shanghai Stock Exchange did not 
listed companies on the information disclosure rating, for disclosure credit 
rating measure, we select 2012-2014 company data only listed in Chinese 
Shenzhen stock markets. Using the same excluding method, we get a total of 
3180 observations. All the data comes from WIND (China) financial database. 
Data are processed by using SPSS software. 
 
4.2 Variable selection and model design 
Dependent variables 
 This paper focuses on the impact of institutional investors on the 
earnings information of listed companies, so we need to find variables that can 
measure the earnings quality of listed companies as our explained variables. In 
this study, we measure companies’ earnings information quality from two 
aspects: 
 (1) Information disclosure quality rating of listed companies, provided 
by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (RANK) 
 (2) We use model to estimate earnings smoothness (ES) as a measure 
of information disclosure quality of listed companies. 
 Since 2001, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange evaluates information 
disclosure quality of listed companies from four aspects of timeliness, 
accuracy, integrity and legitimacy as a basis for rating. Rating results are 
divided into four categories: excellent, good, passing and failing. We 
correspondingly We use this rating as an indicator of the quality of information 
disclosure. Higher level of disclosure indicates better quality of information 
for listed companies. In this paper, as for information disclosure rating, we use 
the ordered logistic regression model to institutional investors ’influence. If the 
rank is A, the assigned value is 1 
 When the rank is D, the assigned value is 4.That is, the higher the level 
of information disclosure, the lower is the value of RANK. 
 Bhattacharya et al. (2003) measured earnings information quality using 
earnings smoothness. This study also uses this measurement to examine 
institutional investors’ impact on earnings management. Earnings smoothness 
(ES) is measured by the ratio of net cash flow variability of operating activities 
to the degree of profit variation of listed companies. The higher the earnings 
smoothness, the lower is the degree of accounting information transparency of 
listed companies. 
 
Independent variables and control variables 
 1. Institutional Investor Shareholding (INS) 
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 The proportion of institutional investors holding the shares at the end 
of the year is the total number of shares held by all institutional investors 
divided by the total share capital. 
   According to the existing research, the factors that may affect the 
quality of earnings information include debt ratio, return on net assets, firm 
size, state-owned nature, ownership concentration, type of auditing firm, 
earnings per share, etc. These factors are controlled to ensure the reliability of 
the results, the control variables are as follows: 
 1. Debt ratio (LEV): Total debt at the end of the period divided by total 
assets at the end of the period. This control variable measures the company’s 
financial risk. 
 2. Return on net assets (ROE): current profit divided by current net 
assets. This control variable measures the company's operating profitability. 
 3. Company size (SIZE): the logarithm of the company's total assets. 
This variable controls the size of the company. 
 4. State-owned nature (STATE): When the company's largest 
shareholder is a state-owned shareholder, the value of this control variable is 
1, otherwise 0. 
 5. Ownership concentration (HER): the sum of squares of the top ten 
shareholders’ holding ratio. 
 6. Auditing firm type (AUD): When the company's annual report is 
audited by the big four accounting firms, the value of this control variable is 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 7. Earnings per share change (ΔEPS): the earnings per share change 
between current year and previous year. 
All variables are defined in Table 1 below 
Table 1 Related Variables Definition 
 variable definition 
Dependent 
variable RANK 
Information disclosure quality rating of listed 
companies, provided by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(for grade A,B,C,D, the value is 1,2,3,4 respectively). 
ES 
Earnings smoothness. The ratio of cash flow variation to 
the degree of profit variation of listed companies. 
Independent and 
control variable 
INS All institutional investors’ holding divided by total share 
capital at the end of the year. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the company's total assets 
ROE Net income divided by shareholders’ equity 
LEV Total liability divided by total asset 
STATE 
If the company is state-owned, the value is 1, otherwise 
0. 
HER 
The sum of squares of the top ten shareholders’ 
holding ratio. 
AUD 
When the company's annual report is audited by the 
big four accounting firms, the value of this control 
variable is 1, otherwise 0. 
European Scientific Journal September 2018 edition Vol.14, No.25 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
316 
ΔEPS 
The difference between Earnings per share for the 
current year and the earnings per share for the previous 
year, then divided by last year earnings per share. 
 
4.3 Research model design 
 In this paper, the descriptive statistical analysis of the variables is 
carried out, and the correlation between the variables is tested. We carry out 
the linear regression of the aggregated data for 2012-2014. Research model is 
established to test the proportion of institutional investors and other control 
factors which have Impact on earnings information quality. 
 For the hypothesis H1a, we build the model as follows: 
RANK= 0
β
+ 1β *INS+ 2β *SIZE+ 3
β
*ROE+ 4β  *LEV+ 5
β
 *STATE+ 6
β
*HER+ 7
β
*AUD+ 8
β
*ΔEPS + 9
β
*∑INDUSTRY + 10β *∑YEAR+ε    （1） 
 This model is an ordered logistic regression model, in which RANK 
for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange information disclosure rating, there are four 
categories of ratings, namely, A, B, C, D, respectively, assigned 1,2,3,4. We 
assume that the higher the proportion of institutional investors, the higher is 
the company's information disclosure rating.  
 That is, if the coefficient 1
β
is negative, the results of the empirical test 
in line with our expectations. Industry and YEAR are respectively controlled. 
For the hypothesis H1b, research model is established as follows: 
ES= 0
β
+ 1β *JGCG+ 2β *SIZE+ 3
β
*ROE+ 4β  *LEV+ 5
β
 *STATE+ 6
β
*HER+ 7
β
*AUD+ 8
β
*ΔEPS + 9
β
*∑INDUSTRY + 10
β
*∑YEAR+ε     （2） 
Where ES is calculated as ES= DEV(∑ CFOK
t
k=t−2 /
ASSETK)/DEV(∑ EARNK/ASSETK
t
k=t−2 ) 
EARNt is the net profit of the company for year t. 
CFO is the operating cash flow of the company for year t. 
ASSETt is the total asset of the company for year t. 
DEV(∑ CFOK
t
k=t−2 /ASSETK):The standard deviation between the net cash 
flow and the total assets during the period (t-2, t) 
DEV(∑ EARNK/ASSETK
t
k=t−2 ):The standard deviation of net profit and total 
assets during (t-2, t) 
 We assume that the higher the proportion of institutional investors, the 
lower is the company's earnings smoothness. That is, if the coefficient 1
β
is 
negative, the results of the empirical test in line with our expectations. 
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5. Empirical results 
 This section provides descriptive statistics to visualize the distribution 
of data. The results are shown in Table 2. From the table we can see listed 
companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange with an average credit rating of 
1.91, close to information disclosure grade B, and the median is 2. This result 
indicates that at least half of the listed company's information disclosure rating 
is good. The difference between the listed company's earnings smoothness is 
very large, the maximum value of 388.79, while the minimum value is only 
0.01, which indicates that the listed company earnings information quality 
difference is relatively large. Chinese institutional holdings proportion is at the 
average 40.63%, which indicates that listed companies account for a large part 
of institutional investors. While the fund holdings of the average ratio of 
5.82%, indicating that the proportion of fund holdings is still relatively small, 
there is room for further development. 
 In this paper, we also provide empirical results to examine the 
relationship between the institutions' shareholding and the quality of earnings 
information. We use the logistic regression of model 1 and perform multiple 
regressions according to model 2. The regression results are shown in Table 
3.From the empirical regression results of model 1, it can be seen that there is 
a significant negative correlation between the proportion of institutional 
investors and RANK, which means that H1a is established. Higher proportion 
of institutional investors' holding can improve companies ’information 
disclosure rating level. As for control variables, the return on net assets, 
financial leverage, the nature of the company, earnings per share, auditing firm 
are significant at 1% descriptive level, which means higher return on net assets 
,higher financial leverage ratio are positively related with information 
disclosure credit rating. At the same time State-owned enterprises, lower 
earnings per share change, and big four auditing firms are also positively 
related with information disclosure credit rating.From the empirical regression 
of model 2, it can be seen that the proportion of institutional investors’ holdings 
and earnings smoothness are significantly negative, which indicates that the 
proportion of institutional investors reduce earnings smoothness, and  H1b is 
established. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics  
Mean St.Dev Median Max Min 
RANK 1.91  0.57  2.00  4.00  1.00  
ES 6.51  16.47  2.46  388.79  0.01  
INS 40.63  23.72  41.79  95.46 0.00  
SIZE 22.06  1.28  21.86  28.51  19.03  
ROE 0.07  0.12  0.07  0.74  -3.20  
LEV 0.44  0.21  0.44  1.05  0.01  
STATE 0.42  0.49  0.00  1.00  0.00  
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HER 0.17  0.12  0.15  0.76  0.00  
△EPS -0.06  0.36  -0.01  4.38  -5.38  
AUD 0.06  0.23  0.00  1.00  0.00  
ACT 0.02  0.18  0.00  4.86  0.00  
NEG 1.78  2.90  0.40  22.82  -4.86  
 
Table 3 Regression Results of Institutions ’shareholdings on Earnings Information Quality 
coefficient Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -2.9321** -2.7537 
INS -0.0072*** -0.0004*** 
SIZE 0.0640* -0.0635 
ROE -6.6729*** 2.1838 
LEV 1.0749*** 7.5389*** 
STATE -0.4767*** 0.2784 
HER -0.0913 -0.3609 
ΔEPS 0.4081*** 1.8516*** 
AUD -0.6712*** -3.0655*** 
INDUSTRY Control Control 
YEAR Control Control 
N 3810 6120 
LR stat 489.67 R2 0.0422 
R-squared 0.0764 Adjusted R2 0.0379 
Prob 0.00*** F 9.9477 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
 From the empirical regression of model 1, it can be seen that there is a 
significant negative correlation between the proportion of institutional 
investors and RANK, which means that H1a is established, that is, the higher 
the proportion of institutional investors' Improve the company's credit 
disclosure level. From the return of control variables, the return on net assets, 
the balance sheet, the nature of the company, earnings growth per share, 
whether the four major audits and corporate credit disclosure rating at 1% 
level, which is the return on net assets High, high gearing ratio, state-owned 
enterprises, low earnings per share growth, the four major audit companies, the 
higher the credit rating. 
 From the empirical regression of model 2, it can be seen that the 
proportion of institutional investors and the holdings of ES are negative, but 
not significant, indicating that the proportion of institutional investors is not 
affected by the surplus, indicating that H1b is not established. 
 To sum up, the overall shareholding ratio of institutional investors has 
a significant impact on information disclosure credit rating. The increase in 
institutional shareholding ratio can improve the company's information 
disclosure credit rating. At the same time, institutional investors also affect 
earnings smoothness. The increase in institutional shareholding ratio reduces 
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the degree of earnings smoothness, which further improves information 
disclosure quality. 
 
6. Research conclusion 
 This paper discusses the impact of institutional investors on the 
earnings information of listed companies from the theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. On the basis of the theoretical analysis, this paper chooses the 
listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares as the research samples 
from 2012 to 2014, and studies the impact of the proportion of institutional 
investors’ shareholding on earnings information quality of listed companies. 
The conclusion of this paper is as follows: the higher the proportion of 
institutional investors, the higher is the credit rating of information disclosure 
quality, and the lower is the earning smoothness degree. 
 From the empirical results, there is a significant positive correlation 
between the proportion of institutional investors and the credit rating of listed 
companies, and the increase in the proportion of holders of institutions can 
improve the company's credit disclosure rating. At the same time, the 
proportion of institutional investors’ shareholding is negatively related to 
earning smoothness. It is noteworthy that there are a variety of institutional 
investors diversified in the size, expertise and resources. Combined with 
different level of corporate governance of the company, it is worthy of further 
research about different type of institutional investors ’impact on earnings 
information quality. 
 With the growth of institutional investors, the institutional shareholders 
promote the improvement of earnings information quality through the 
participation of corporate governance, which will become the future 
unstoppable trend. Therefore, Chinese capital market can improve corporate 
governance by vigorously developing institutional investors. In view of the 
research results of this paper and the current situation of institutional investors 
in China, we put forward the following policy recommendations. Firstly, 
vigorously develop institutional investors to improve the company's 
governance level. With the rapid rise of capital markets, institutional investors 
continue to grow and develop. In the capital market they will also show more 
and more strong influence. The rise of institutional investors can avoid “free 
rider” phenomenon from individual investors and strengthen the level of 
corporate governance, but also to avoid individual investors because the 
shareholding ratio is too low, weak weaknesses. Secondly, China should 
develop positive institutional investors to improve the quality of corporate 
earnings information. 
 The use of positive institutional investors will promote the 
development of capital markets.It can be seen from the research of this paper 
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that positive institutional investors have a positive effect on the quality of 
earnings information of listed companies. 
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